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INTRODUCTION

In 1969 the Supreme Court of Florida, in the case of Shingleton v.
Bussey, I construed the Florida real party in interest rule 2 as allowing
the joinder of an automobile liability insurer as a codefendant in a
negligence action against the insured. The rule of Shingleton was soon
expanded to apply not only to automobile insurers, but also to liability
insurers in general, 3 such as premises liability4 and professional liability
insurers. 5
The advent of the joinder rule of Shingleton raises some interesting questions with respect to its applicability in federal court proceedings in Florida. The purpose of this comment is to examine one such
question: Whether a shipowner's protection and indemnity insurer can
properly be joined with the insured in a federal court in Florida in an
admiralty proceeding for limitation of liability under 46 U.S.C. section
183 et seq. (1970) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure supplemental
rule F. 6 Limitation of liability is a right which is personal to the
shipowner; consequently, his insurer, if joined in a limitation proceeding, 7 might not be able to avail itself of the protection of limited
liability and thus might be held liable to the limits of the policy.8
* Senior Articles & Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review.

**
1.
2.
3.

Senior Articles & Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.210.
Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 230 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1st Dist.) off'd, 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla.

1970).
4. Id.; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 231 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
5. Shipman v. Kinderman, 232 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. supplemental rule F for certain admiralty and maritime claims.
7. See note 22 infra and accompanying text.
8. See Olympic Towing Co. v. Nebel Towing Co., 419 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 989 (1970); In re Independent Towing Co., 242 F. Supp. 950 (E.D. La. 1965).
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It has already been determined that such joinder is permissible in
Louisiana 9 and in Puerto Rico10 where the respective legislatures have
enacted statutes"' permitting direct actions against insurance companies without the necessity of filing suit against the insured. It has
also been determined in certain admiralty courts that in the absence of
a state direct action statute, joinder of a shipowner's protection and
indemnity insurer is not permissible in a limitation of liability proceed12
ing.

Florida's judicially created joinder rule, which allows a direct
action against an insurer when the insured is a party, is not as broad
as the rule established by statutes in Louisiana and Puerto Rico where
the insurer can be sued separately. 13 Yet by allowing joinder of insurance companies, the Florida law departs substantially from the usual
rule which precludes such joinder in the absence of a direct action
statute. The availability of joinder of a protection and indemnity
liability insurer in a limitation of liability proceeding is largely
dependent upon state law with respect to direct actions, 14 and the
status of Florida law is somewhere between that of states having direct
action statutes and states without such statutes. Therefore, the issue of
whether a shipowner's insurer can be joined with the insured in an
admiralty limitation of liability proceeding presents a close question
involving many aspects of substantive law and procedure, as well as
state, national, and international policy.
Generally, direct actions afford protection to an injured party by
assuring him that in the event of the insured's being found liable, the
insurance company will bear the burden of the loss up to the policy
limits. If such a direct action were applicable in an admiralty limitation of liability proceeding, the liability of the insurer could exceed the
limited liability of the insured. As a result, not only would the insured
be affected by increased premiums, but the United States merchant
marine might be put at a competitive economic disadvantage with
European shipping. A brief summary of the origin and purpose of the
Limitation of Liability Act will provide some insight into how competition can be affected by broadening the liability of the shipowner and
his protection and indemnity insurers, which, in effect, is what a direct
action would accomplish.
9. Olympic Towing Co. v. Nebel Towing Co., 419 F.2d 230(Sth Cir. 1969),cert. denied, 397
U.S. 989 (1970); In re Sincere Navigation Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. La. 1970).
10. Torres v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 275 F. Supp. 784 (D.P.R. 1967).
11. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 22, § 655 (1974); LAWS OF P.R. ANN. ch. 26, § 2003 (1974).
12. Complaint of Harbor Towing Corp., 335 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Md. 1971); Pettus v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 322 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Pa. 1971); In re Pacific Inland Naviagation Co., 263
F. Supp. 915 (D. Hawaii 1967).
13. See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
14. See The M/V "Tungus" v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959). "[A]dmiralty courts, when

invoked to protect rights rooted in state law, endeavor to determine the issues in accordance with the
substantive law of the State. "Id. at 593, citing Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 245
(1942). This case dealt with the question of whether a federal court sitting in admiralty should apply a

state wrongful death statute.
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HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE LIMITATION
OF LIABILITY ACT

In the early 19th century, various forms of limitation of liability
statutes were being enacted in European countries, as a result of which
the United States was put at a competitive disadvantage in maritime
commerce. i In England, for example, Parliament passed a limitation
of liability statute which provided that, in the event of an accident at
sea due to the negligence of the vessel's master or crew, the owner's
liability would be limited to the value of the vessel and the freight due
or to become due. 1 6 Statutes of this nature provided some financial
protection to shipowners, who, without a limitation statute, could
have been held liable for the full amount of the damages resulting from
a disaster at sea. Furthermore, freedom from the threat of such ruinous liability tended to encourage investment in the European shipping
industry. To remedy this situation, the United States passed its first
federal limitation of liability act in 1851,17 the underlying purpose of
which was to encourage American shipbuilding and to prevent the
United States shipping industry from being subject to severe economic
losses that shipowners in England and the rest of Europe did not have
to risk. 18

When the statute was first enacted, American courts gave it a
liberal construction in favor of the shipowner. For example, the English statute, after which the Limitation of Liability Act was patterned
by the United States, provided that the fund be limited to the valuation of the ship before the accident.1 9 Since this construction would
have defeated the primary purpose of the United States statute, the
United States Supreme Court in Norwich Co. v. Wright 20 held that the
fund be valued at the time suit is filed. If valued before, as in
England, and the vessel were destroyed, the shipowner could be liable
for an amount equal to the value of a ship which no longer existed.
However, if valued after the loss, as in the United States statute, the
shipowner would be protected financially against complete disasters.
The time of valuation was further construed by the Court to take
place at the end of the voyage; therefore, if the ship sank, the time of
the sinking would mark the voyage's termination. 2 1 Under the previous rule, whereby the ship was valued at the time suit was filed, the
vessel could be raised and repaired before any suit was commenced.
E. BENEDICT, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY (6th ed. 1940).
16. An Act to Limit the Responsibility of Ship Owners, in Certain Cases, 53 Geo. 3, c. 159
(1813).
17. Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635 (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq. (1970)). Maine
and Massachusetts had already passed similar statutes. See The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122
(1894).
18. Moore v. American Transp. Co., 65 U.S. 1, 39 (1860).
19. Id. at 40.
20. 80 U.S. 104 (1871).
21. The City of Norwich v. Norwich & N.Y Transp. Co., 118 U.S. 468 (1886).
15. See
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The limitation fund would then include the value of the repaired
vessel, and thus the policy of the statute as expressed in the Norwich
case would have been circumvented.
The Limitation of Liability Act provided that the liability of the
vessel owner would be limited to an amount not in excess of "the value
of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then
pending."'2 2 Although it had already been decided that the value of the
owner's interest was to be determined at the end of the voyage, there
was much confusion as to what constituted the "owner's interest." In
The City of Norwich, 2 3 the United States Supreme Court held that hull
insurance proceeds were not part of the fund, although the Court
subsequently held that the value of the owner's claims against third
parties was included. 24 The Court also defined "freight then pending"
as the earnings of the voyage, which included passenger fares and
freight charges, whether prepaid or collect on delivery.25 No deduction
26
was allowed for expenses.
Until 1935 the Limitation of Liability Act was not substantially
amended, 27 and, as can be seen from the foregoing, the courts were
construing the statute liberally in favor of shipowners. Then, in 1935,
the disaster of the Morro Castle28 prompted the passage of the Sirovich
30
amendments. 29 This marked the beginning of a trend in the Congress
and the courts towards giving more consideration to the injured persons and property owners than had been accorded previously. When
the Limitation Act was first passed in 1851, vessels were being used
primarily to transport cargo, not persons. When oceanliners began
carrying passengers across the Atlantic, with the ensuing disasters, the
purposes of the Act paled in comparison to the amount of injury that
was suffered. The legislature could no longer find shipbuilding more
22. 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1970) provides:

The liability of the owner of any vessel, whether American or foreign, for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction by any person of any property, goods, or merchandise
shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or
for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred,
without the privity of knowledge of such owner or owners, shall not,. except in the cases
provided for in subsection (b) of this section, exceed the amount or value of the interest
of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending.
For the exception provided in subsection (b) see note 34 infra.
23. 118 U.S. 468 (1886). Hull insurance provides protection against loss of the ship (hull).
This is distinguished from protection and indemnity insurance which protects the owner against
liabilities specified in separate policies.
24. O'Brien v. Miller, 168 U.S. 287 (1897).
25. The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122 (1894).
26. In re W.E. Hedger Co., 59 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1932).

27. The statute had been amended in certain sections, e.g., Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 100,
§ 69, 16 Stat. 458 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 181 (1970)).
28. New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 32 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.N.Y.
1940), rev'd, 117 F.2d 404 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 580 (1941). In this case, the claims
totaled $13,500,000, while the owners sought to limit their liability to $20,000.
29. Act of-June 5, 1936, ch. 521 § 1 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 183(b)-(f) (1970)).

30. Merchant Marine Act of June 29, 1936, ch. 858, § 101, 49 Stat. 1985, as amended, 46
U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (1970).
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important than compensating human suffering. Therefore, the
Sirovich amendments 3 1 and the Fire Bil 3 2 were passed for the primary
purpose of compensating personal injury and death claims.
The main section of the Sirovich amendments provides that when
the owner's liability, as previously limited under the Act, is insufficient
to pay all losses in full, the amount of the fund available for bodily
33
injuries and loss of life claims should be increased to $60 per ton.
Therefore, if a vessel is totally destroyed, a minimum fund is made
available, but only for personal injury and death claims. 34 In addition,
the original Act provided that the liability of the owner of a "seagoing
vessel" for personal injury and death claims could be limited only if he
were without privity or knowledge of the occurrence causing the
injury. Through the expansion of the privity or knowledge concept,
the amendments have restricted the shipowner's right of limited liability by imputing the privity or knowledge of the master, superintendent, or managing agent to the owner. 35 This is significant since
shipowners could often claim that since they were not aboard the
vessel at the time of injury, they had no privity or knowledge and
hence their liability was limited.
The second law passed by the Congress was the Fire Bill, 3 6 which
applied to any vessel which had berths or stateroom accommodations
for fifty or more persons. Before embarking on any voyage, the owner
was required to establish his financial responsibility, 37 the amount of
31. The amendments added sections (b) thru (f) to 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1970).
32. 46 U.S.C. § 817(d) (1970).
33. 46 U.S.C. § 183(c) (1970) provides:
For purposes of this section the tonnage of a seagoing steam or motor vessel shall be her
gross tonnage without deduction on account of engine room, and the tonnage of a
seagoing sailing vessel shall be her registered tonnage: Provided, that there shall not be
included in such tonnage any space occupied by seamen or apprentices and appropriated
to their use.
34. 46 U.S.C. § 183(b) (1970) provides:
In the case of any seagoing vessel, if the amount of the owner's liability as limited under
subsection (a) of this section is insufficient to pay all losses in full, and the portion of such
amount applicable to the payment of losses in respect of loss of life or bodily injury is less
than $60 per ton or such vessel's tonnage, such portion shall be increased to an amount
equal to $60 per ton, to be available only for the payment of losses in respect of loss of life or
bodily injury. If such portion so increased is insufficient to pay such losses in full, they shall
te paid therefrom in proportion to their respective amounts.
If a ship's gross tonnage were 10,000 tons and valued at $1,000,000 after a disaster, and the total
claims are in excess of this fund, the Sirovich amendment would apply. Assume the cargo claims
totaled $700,000 and the bodily injury claims were $700,000. Since the fund is proportionately
divided among the respective claims, $500,000 would be made available to the bodily injury
claimants. Applying the amendment provisions, at $60 per ton, the minimum fund available should
be $600,000; therefore, the excess of $600,000 over the amount proportionately distributed to the
personal injury claimants ($500,000) would be $100,000. The fund would then be $1,100,000;
$500,000 for cargo and $600,000 for personal injury claimants.
35. 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1970). In Avera v. Florida Towing Corp., 322 F.2d 155(5th Cir. 1963),
the court held:
[K]nowledge means not only personal cognizance but also the means of knowledge... of
contemplated loss or condition likely to produce or contribute to loss, unless appropriate means are adopted to prevent it.
Id. at 166.
36. 46 U.S.C. § 817(d) (1970).
37. Id. This could have been established by insurance, posting a bond, being self-insured, or
any other means of proving financial security.
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which was determined by a sliding scale based upon the vessel's
38
accommodations.
Concurrent with the congressional reevaluation of the Limitation
of Liability Act, the judicial branch was called upon to further interpret the statute's provisions. One issue concerned whether the Act
39
restricted a shipowner's liability in a contract action. In In re Wood
an injured seaman based his claim on the fact that the owner breached
his warranty that the vessel was seaworthy; because the action lay in
contract, the court held that the limitation statute was not available to
the owner. Courts also extended this theory-that a shipowner may
not limit his liability in an action based upon contract-to the flotilla
doctrine: When there is a contract requiring the use of more than one
vessel, the value of all vessels necessary to the operation should be
included in the fund, even though a fire or other disaster may have
affected only one ship.4 6 The contract theory was further applied to
preclude the owner from limiting his liability against claims of injured
41
seamen for maintenance and cure.
Although limiting the types of claims that may be defended by the
limitation statute, the courts have expanded the number of persons the
statute was meant to protect. The courts have broadened the statute to
include as "shipowners" such parties as shareholders, morgagees, prior
vendors, life tenants, trustees, and government agencies operating
privately owned ships in wartime. 4 2 This expansion is in addition to a
broad provision within the statute itself which makes reference to "the
owner of any vessel, whether American or foreign . . . . ,43 Courts
have recognized that the statute applies to both domestic and foreign
vessels,4 4 and have held that even where both parties to the suit are
foreign, the United States may have jurisdiction to hear the case,
45
provided there is no forum-selection clause to the contrary.
38. For example, if there were 2000 passengers, $12,500 would be available for each one in the
event of a disaster. This amount is obviously inadequate. 46 U.S.C. § 817(d)(a) (1970).
39. 230 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1956).
40. Brown & Root Marine Operators, Inc. v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 377 F.2d 724 (5th Cir.
1967); In re United States Dredging Corp., 264 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1959).
41. Murray v. New York Cent. R.R., 171 F. Supp. 80(S.D.N.Y. 1959), af'd, 287 F.2d 152 (2d
Cir. 1961). Maintenance and cure was a remedy'available to a seaman when the voyage terminated
early. He was allowed to recover an amount equivalent to what he would have earned had the voyage

not ended unexpectedly. His subsistence and lodging were also considered. Comment, Maintenance
and Cure, The Jones Act, and Land-Based Seamen, 46 TUL. L. REv. 877 (1972).
42. Adler, For Abolition or Liberalization of Present Limitation of Liability Statute, ABA
Section of Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Law Proceedings 409 (1968). In re Barracuda
Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
43. 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1970).
44. The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24 (1881).
45. The Mandu, 102 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1939). Problems arise when an accident occurs to a
foreign ship in international waters, as a result of which the owner, being sued in an American
court, is seeking to limit his liability under 46 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq. (1970). An issue is raised
whether procedural or substantive law governs as to the limit of liability. Generally, the
substantive law of the country represented by the vessel's flag governs the issue of liability (In re
Chadade S.S. Co., 266 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. Fla. 1967)); while the forum's law applies to
procedure. Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. Robert Stewart & Sons, 336 U.S. 386 (1949). When
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In contrast to the liberal interpretation as to whom the defense of
limitation of liability is available, the courts have provided procedural
benefits to certain claimants against the limitation fund. Although
generally the federal district court has exclusive jurisdiction in limitation of liability cases, 4 6 an exception is made where there is only one
claim or where the aggregate of all claims will not exhaust the available limitation fund. In these situations, the federal district court will
not enjoin the prosecution of claims in state courts;4 7 whereas if there
is a possibility that the claims will exceed the fund, the court is
48
justified in staying other actions.
If the injured party seeks to prosecute in a state court, he must
stipulate to the owner's right to seek limitation of liability in a federal
district court. As part of that stipulation, plaintiff must agree not to
both the forum and the country whose substantive law is applicable have limitation statutes, it is
necessary to determine whether the respective statutes are procedural or substantive. This
determination was made in Black Diamond, where a United States ship collided with a British
vessel in Belgian waters. The owner of the British ship sought to limit his liability to the amount
established by the Brussels Convention of 1924, which had been adopted by Belgium and
Britain. If the United States limitation statute were applied, the limit of the fund would be
$1,000,000, as compared to $325,000 if the Brussels Convention were applicable. The issue was
raised because the forum, the United States, has a procedural requirement that bond be posted by
the shipowner in an amount equal to his potential liability. Although posting of the bond is
procedural, the amount is determined by the applicable substantive law. Therefore, the Court in
Black Diamond held that if the Brussels Convention were procedural, the forum's law would
govern as to the amount of the bond. Alternatively, if the Brussels Convention were substantive,
the law of the locus of the tort would apply.
Although the court in In re Chadade S.S. Co., 266 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. Fla. 1967), found a
distinction between the substantive limit of liability and the procedural means to obtain it, G.
Gilmore and C. Black, Law of Admiralty (1975) at 939 state:
[Oin the theory that limitation law is procedural rather than substantive, so that, on
received principles of the conflict of laws, the law of the forum should govern, it has
been assumed that American Courts will apply American limitation law in any limitation proceedings properly before them.
The United States Supreme Court in the Titanic-Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Mellor, 233
U.S. 718 (1914), held that a limitation proceeding is procedural since it attaches to the remedy,
not the right. Gilmore and Black do not feel that the Titanic and Black Diamond decisions are in
conflict.
46. ADMIRALTY R. 54, now known as FED. R. CIv. P. supplemental rule F.
47. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, LAW OF ADMIRALTY 864 (1975). The procedure for allowing
limitation of liability requires the shipowner to file a petition or plead limitation as a defense to an
action brought by an injured claimant. If the shipowner files a petition to limit his liability, it
must be filed within six months of receipt of a written claim against the owner, or may be filed
before any claim is received. The petitioner must post a bond or cash for the value of the vessel and
pending freight or surrender the vessel and secure pending freight. He must also furnish bond for
such additional amounts as the court may fix as necessary to carry out the provisions of the statute, as
amended. Petitioner then files a complaint setting forth facts and a prayer for relief. Then, on
application of petitioner, the court shall enjoin all other actions or proceedings against the petitioner
or his property with respect to claims subject to limitation of liability. FED. R. Civ. P. supplemental
rule F. But see In re Marsuerte Compania Naviera, S.A., 252 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(attachment action allowed to proceed).
Petitioner must give notice to all known injured parties or claimants and publish notice as
directed by the court. Then, claimants appear and file their claims. They may contest any issue of
the owner's case or any issue of the claim of any other claimant. FED. R. Civ. P. supplemental
rule F.
48. See In re City of New York, 1941 A.M.C. 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
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raise the defense of res judicata. 4 9 If a defense against such limitation
is raised, the issue is contested in a federal court without a jury; then,
the merits of the case are decided in the state court, where a jury trial
is available., 0
III.

GOVERNMENT AID TO SHIPPING-POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Even though the courts and the legislature have attempted to ease
the effect of the limitation statute with respect to claims for death and
bodily injuries, the problem of inadequate compensation still remains.
The original purposes of the statute-to promote shipbuilding and
encourage competition-have been only partially satisfied by a combination of the Act's provisions and government subsidies.
Under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936,51 Congress established a
construction differential subsidy (CDS) and an operating differential
subsidy (ODS). CDS provides a subsidy to American shipyards to
enable them to build more ships for United States flag registry and
operation, at a cost to the prospective shipowner which is competitive
with foreign-flag capital costs. ODS provides a direct operating cost
differential subsidy to shipowners, which is designed to make the cost
of operating an American-flag ship competitive with the cost of
operat52
ing similar vessels under the registry of a foreign country.
In addition, further government assistance to shipbuilding was
provided in cargo preference laws requiring that government owned or
financed goods must be carried by United States flag ships. The
Maritime Office of Market Development and the National Maritime
Council have programs to actively promote cargo for United States
flag carriers and to acquaint shippers with the advantages of
American-flag services. 5 3 Further, the Merchant Marine Act was
amended in 1970 to allow for a deferral of income tax on profits
connected with shipping, if the money is put into a capital construction
54
fund.
Notwithstanding the subsidies, preference laws, and the Limitation of Liability Act, American-flag ships carry less than seven percent
of the United States import-export cargo; hence, the congressional policy of improving the competitive position of the United States in world
shipping is not being achieved. 5 5 Additionally, the United States
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

In re Red Star Barge Line, 160 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1947).
Id. See also, ex parte Green, 286 U.S. 437 (1932).
46 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (1970).
Kominers, FederalGovernment Aids to Merchant Shipping, 47 TUL. L. REv. 691 (1973).
Id.

54. Act of October 21, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-469, 84 Stat. 1018, amending 46 U.S.C.
§§ 1101 et seq. (1970).

55. Kier, The Effect of Direct Action Statutes on P & I Insurance, 43 TUL. L. REv. 638
n.116 (1969); 33 N.M.U. PILOT, No. 11, Nov. 1968 at 11, 25;Hearings on H.R. 13940 Before the
Subcomm. on Merchant Marine of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 245 (1968).
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fishing industry has been described as "nonexistent. ' '5 6 Clearly the
United States merchant marine still requires aid.
On the other hand, persons suffering harm as a result of a catastrophe at sea have a right to an adequate recovery. Cargo owners, of
course, are not greatly affected by the Limitation of Liability Act due
to the passage of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 57 which
imposes its own limit on the liability of the owner. Furthermore,
insurance is generally available to protect the interests of cargo owners,
and, therefore, can be reflected as part of the cost of shipping. Unlike
the cargo owners, however, those suffering bodily harm or death have
a strong case for the repeal of the Limitation Act.
Critics have attacked the statute on several grounds. First, it
encourages forum shopping by allowing the shipowner either to
choose the forum in which to file the petition or to have a friendly
58
claimant file suit in the forum in which he desires to file his petition.
Second, except for the single claimant doctrine, 5 9 the right of trial by
jury is denied to claimants. 60 Third, the limitation period within
which claimants may file suit may be as short as thirty days, and it
runs from the time notice is sent to potential claimants. 6 1 Fourth, the
'' 62
courts have greatly expanded the meaning of the term "shipowners.
Most importantly,
[i]t is claimed by opponents of limitation of liability that vessel
owners seek to subsidize the shipping industry at the expense
of the victims and claimants. It is further claimed that inasmuch as less and less cargo is being shipped in American
bottoms, it is the foreign flag merchant marine that, in effect,
will be subsidized by the plight of the victims and claimants.

63

This analysis presupposes, however, that there is only one alternative to the present system of limited recovery, i.e., recovery in full
from the shipowner under traditional theories of negligence and respondeat superior. If it is the public policy of the United States to
provide compensation for those injured in maritime disasters as well as
to protect the shipping industry, there is no reason that Congress
cannot effectuate this public policy by providing public funds to compensate the injured parties without further damaging an already ailing
American merchant marine.
56. Adler, supra note 42, at 409; Roberts, For Retention of Limitation of Liability for
Shipowners, ABA Section of Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Law Proceedings 415
(1968).
57. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300 et seq. (1970).
58. 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1970); FED. R. Crv. P. supplemental rule F.
59. See notes 46-50 supra and accompanying text.
60. Adler, supra note 42.
61. FED. R. CIv. P. supplemental rule F (4).
62. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
63. Adler, supra note 42, at 412.
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Congress has already indicated that it is unwilling to alter further
the Limitation of Liability Act. Bills have been introduced in Congress
to abolish the Limitation Act, 64 to repeal limitation with respect to
personal injury and death claims, 65 and to adopt the Brussels Convention. 66 None of these bills has been passed.
Proponents of the statute have asserted various reasons for retention of the Act. Among these are the desirability of worldwide uniformity of maritime law, the need to encourage shipping and investment
where there is no subsidy, the benefit of having all proceedings tried in
one action and in one court, the need to encourage investment in the
ailing American fishing industry, the need to build maritime protection
for national
defense, and the prevention of prohibitive insurance
67
rates.
The courts, however, in discussing the desirability of the Limitation Act and in weighing the needs of the shipping industry against
those of injured persons, have said, in cases such as In re Independent
Towing Co., 68 that they cannot countenance, while administering
equity in an admiralty court, the inequity of placing the financial
burden of the injuries and losses upon the injured parties and their
families.
An equitable solution to this problem is that compensation to
those suffering bodily harm be provided either by the entire shipping
industry as an added cost of doing business or by the general public in
the form of an additional subsidy. In light of the financially troubled
status of the United States shipping and fishing industries and a
strong public policy to preserve them, a government subsidy provided
69
by Congress might be the better solution.
64. S. 3251, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); H.R. 17254, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
65. S. 3251, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); H.R. 17254, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
66. Brussels Convention on Limitation of Liability, Oct. 1923. 4 REVUE DE DROIT
MARITIME COMPARE 597 (1923).The Brussels Convention differs from the American Limitation
of Liability Act considerably. Among the differences are that under the Brussels Convention, a
maximum fund is established in which $67 per ton is available for all claims and $140 per ton is
exclusively used for injury and death claims, there is no alternative provision with respect to the
value of the vessel, and the shipowner may file his petition in the court of any member nation. In
the event of a total disaster, the Brussels Convention would provide a larger fund ($207 as
compared to $60) than would the American statute; but in ordinary collision cases or partial
disasters, the Brussels Convention may be smaller since the prescribed amount for the fund
represents the maximum recovery. If the Convention were adopted, an issue would be raised as
to the effect, if any, of state laws in an action based upon the Brussels Convention. If the state
provides for direct actions against insurers, would this be honored in a federal court applying the
Brussels Convention? If so, what would prevent a foreign shipowner from bringing his petition in
a state or nation where such an action exists, since he may petition to limit his liability in any
court of any member nation? How would this affect America's position in world commerce?
67. Roberts, supra note 56.
68. 242 F. Supp. 950 (E.D. La. 1965).
69. Such a subsidy could take the form of an addition to the limitation tund, or be based on
a percentage of individual harms suffered. In the latter case, the federal government might
contribute an additional amount to the fund, which could be a fixed percent of the amount of
personal injuries suffered.
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DIRECT ACTION STATUTES

The federal courts in Louisiana and Puerto Rico have arrived at a
70
different solution to this question without congressional action.
These courts have consolidated limitation of liability proceedings and
direct actions against the shipowners' protection and indemnity insurers, thereby allowing the claimant to recover from the insurer up to the
limits of the policy, regardless of the amount of the limitation fund. In
order to place the decisions of these jurisdictions in proper perspective,
it is necessary
first to consider the case of Maryland Casualty Co. v.
71
Cushing.
In that case, a towboat, The Jane Smith, capsized and sank when
it collided with a concrete railroad pier in the Atchafalaya River in
Louisiana, resulting in the drowning of five crew members. The owner
of the towboat filed a petition for limitation of liability in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The personal representatives of five seamen brought a diversity action
against the owner of the bridge and against the liability insurers
of the
72
boat owner, pursuant to the Louisiana direct action statute.
The district court granted a motion for summary judgment, dismissing the suit against the insurers on the ground that such application of the direct action statute would contravene the essential purpose of the Limitation of Liability Act and would materially prejudice
the characteristic features of general maritime law. 73 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the Louisiana direct
action statute was not in conflict with substantive admiralty law or
74
with any admiralty remedy.
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision with three separate opinions, vacated the court of appeals decision and remanded the case,
holding that the direct action could proceed only after the conclusion
75
of the limitation proceeding.
76
Four Justices were of the opinion that the Louisiana direct
action statute was in conflict with and an intrusion upon the harmony
and uniformity of maritime law. They reasoned that to allow the direct
action to proceed would strip shipowners of the benefit of their insurance protection where the claims exceeded insurance policy limits;
would reduce the availability and increase the shipowners' cost of
70. See notes 81-94 infra and accompanying text.
71. 347 U.S. 409 (1954).
72. LA. REv. STAT. ch. 22, § 655 (1974).
73. Cushing v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 99 F. Supp. 681 (E.D. La. 1951), rev'd sub nom. Cushing
v. Maryland Cas. Co., 198 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1952), vacated and remanded to district court, 347
U.S. 409 (1954).
74. Cushing v. Maryland Cas. Co., 198 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1952), vacated and remanded to
district court, 347 U.S. 409 (1954).
75. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954), vacating and remanding to district
courts, 198 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1952), rev'g sub. nom. Cushing v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 99 F. Supp. 681
(E.D. La. 1951).
76. Justices Frankfurter, Reed, Jackson, and Burton.
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insurance, thereby detracting from the benefit which Congress intended to bestow on the shipping industry; would detract from the
benefit of a concursus, 77 forcing shipowners and crew to relitigate the
same issues several times in several different forums, possibly resulting
in conflicting court decisions; and would prejudice the rights of claimants who rely on the limitation proceeding to present their claims if
one or two other claimants were permitted to drain away all of the
insurance proceeds in direct actions.
The four dissenting Justices 78 saw no conflict between the
Louisiana direct action statute and the maritime law. They said that
the Limitation Act was not "intended to give shipowners additional
special privileges with respect to liability insurance or to interfere with
state regulation of any type of insurance. '7 9 The dissenters further
stated that the intent of Congress was to reduce shipowners' obligations caused by wrecks, not to reduce their cost of doing business due
to higher insurance premiums.
In a separate concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Clark stated that
the conflict between the Louisiana direct action statute and the Limitation Act could be resolved without invalidating the state statute. He
determined that by allowing the limitation action to proceed to a
conclusion and subsequently permitting a direct action against the
insurer, the shipowner could have the benefit of his insurance; there
would be no depletion of insurance funds to the prejudice of some
claimants; and the benefits of the concursus would be realized.
In order to break the 4-4 deadlock, the four justices who saw a
conflict between state and admiralty law adopted the solution of Justice Clark and held that a direct action could be maintained only after
the conclusion of the limitation proceeding. It is difficult to determine
the precise effect of this decision.
Because of the Court's extraordinary division, it is impossible
to say what the Cushing case stands for, beyond the fact that
it presumably established a procedure to be followed by
lower courts in handling similar cases until the Supreme
Court further clarified the issues.8 0
So far, the Supreme Court has declined to clarify these issues.
A similar situation came before a Louisiana district court in the
case of In re Independent Towing Co. 8 1 In that case a shipowner filed
a petition for limitation of liability in the District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana. The claimants then brought a direct action
against the shipowner's insurer in the same court. The insurance
77. A concursus would result in the bringing together of all claims arising out of the
occurrence in one forum and in one action.
78. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, and Minton.
79. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 434 (1954).
80. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 47, at 910.
81. 242 F. Supp. 950 (E.D. La. 1965).
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underwriters moved to stay the direct action proceedings pending the
outcome of the limitation proceeding. The court denied the motion and
instead ordered that both actions be consolidated. The court reasoned
that in this way the benefits of a concursus would be retained, and the
82
shipowner would still get the benefit of his insurance.
Also, in that case, the court found that limitation of shipowners'
liability is a defense which is personal to the shipowner. The court
further determined that since under the Louisiana direct action statute
the insurer may not avail itself of the personal defenses of the insured, an
insurer may not avail itself of the defense of limitation of liability and
therefore may be held liable up to the policy limits. Thus, from the
claimant's point of view, in a limitation of liability action in a federal
court sitting in Louisiana, the amount of the fund is in effect increased to
the limits of the protection and indemnity policy; to the extent of any such
increase, the Limitation Act can be circumvented.
In a similar case in Puerto Rico, Torres v. Interstate Fire and
Casualty Co., 8 3 where six direct actions against a shipowner's insurers
were pending in the same court as the shipowner's petition for limitation of liability, the court allowed all of the actions to be consolidated
and tried before a jury without waiting for a trial and entry of
judgment in the limitation proceeding. In that case, the court
examined Puerto Rico decisions and concluded that under the Puerto
Rico direct action statute, an insurer could not avail itself of defenses
personal to the insured. Therefore, the court concluded, as did the
court in Independent Towing, that the insurers could not raise the
personal defense of limitation of shipowner's liability.
In Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nebel Towing Co., 84 a shipowner
82. The court outlined several alternatives to be followed, depending upon whether limitation of liability is granted and the amount of the claims established:
1. If the policy limits be sufficient to satisfy the claims established in the direct actions,

there the matter ends, and the limitation proceeding as concerns the direct action
claimants would become moot.
II. Should the insurance coverage be insufficient to satisfy all the claims in the direct
action against the insurer, then the court would proceed with the limitation hearing.
Naturally, no attempt could be made to prove additional damages beyond those established in the direct action proceeding ...
A. If the limitation is granted and the amount of the limitation fund exceeds the
insurance coverage, then the fund would be credited with the insurance recovery, and
the remainder would be distributed to the claimants in accordance with the amount and
rank of the claims proven.
B. If limitation is granted, but the fund is less than the amount of insurance coverage,

then the limitation fund is credited with the amount already recovered from the
shipowner's insurer, and no further recovery would be allowed. In this way, the
shipowner would be protected by his insurance to the same extent as he would be in any
other jurisdiction, thus assuring uniformity of treatment of shipowners in all jurisdictions of the United States.
C. If no limitation of liability is granted, then the shipowner would be credited with the
amount of damages recovered from the insurer in the direct actions, and then stand
liable for the entire amount by which the proven damages exceed the insurance coverage.
In re Independent Towing Co., 242 F. Supp. 950, 956 (E.D. La. 1965).
83. 275 F. Supp. 784 (D.P.R. 1967).
84. 419 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
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filed a petition for limitation of liability and a claimant filed a diversity
action against the shipowner's protection and indemnity insurer in the
same federal court in Louisiana. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the action could properly be consolidated since "any conflict
between the direct action statute and the federal provision for '85a
concursus of claims in admiralty is so minimal as to be insignificant.
The court further reasoned in Olympic Towing that the Limitation
of Liability Act was not intended to limit the amount of premiums
paid by vessel owners on insurance; hence, the possibility of higher
premiums was not a sufficient basis for permitting an insurer to limit
its liability. Also, the court reaffirmed the proposition that limitation of
liability is a personal defense 86 and that personal defenses are not
87
available to insurers sued under the Louisiana direct action statute.
Thus, in the Fifth Circuit the rule has developed that where a
direct action against a shipowner's insurer is pending in the federal
court in which the shipowner has filed a petition for limitation of
liability, the actions may be consolidated and the direct action need
not be stayed until completion of the limitation proceeding. While this
procedure apparently conflicts with the holding of Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Cushing, the court reasoned in Olympic Towing that since the
"reason for requiring the limitation proceeding to be completed first is
to permit the vessel owner to receive the benefit of his insurance," 88 a
different procedure which serves this same policy is permissible.
The direct action and the limitation proceeding must be pending
in the same federal court, otherwise the limitation action must be
completed before the direct action may proceed. Thus, where a direct
action against a shipowner's insurer was filed in a federal court in
Louisiana and the shipowner's petition for limitation of liability was
pending in a federal court in Texas, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
ordered the Louisiana direct action stayed until the completion of the
limitation proceeding. 8 9 Likewise, where a shipowner filed his petition
in a federal court in Louisiana and a claimant sued the shipowner's
protection and indemnity insurer in a Louisiana state court, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an injunction prohibiting the state
court action from continuing until after the completion of the limitation proceedings.
85. Id.

9

O

at 235.

86. Id. at 238; see Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Charles Ferran & Co., 251 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. La.
1966).
87. In Olympic Towing, six judges would have granted a rehearing en banc. Three judges
joined in a dissenting opinion stating that the court's holding was contrary to the holding of the
Supreme Court in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing.
88. 419 F.2d 230, 235 n.17 (5th Cir. 1969), quoted in In re Sincere Navigation Corp., 317 F.
Supp. 1, 3 (E.D. La. 1970), where the court followed Olympic Towing.
89. Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 322 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1963).
90. Guillot v. Cenac Towing Co., 366 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1966). See noLes 47-50 supra and
accompanying text.
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In jurisdictions where there are no direct action statutes, the
federal courts have consistently refused to allow joinder of an insurer
with the insured petitioner in a limitation proceeding, or to increase
the amount of the limitation fund to include insurance policy benefits. 9 1 The courts have reasoned that it would be improper to alter
judicially the express provisions of the Limitation of Liability Act
solely on the basis of a desire to afford greater relief to injured
claimants when Congress has had the opportunity to make such
changes but has refused to do so. 9 2

Thus, the court in Pettus v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 93

stated:
It may be that there is a need to re-examine and liberalize the
owner-oriented rules in this field, but this can more safely
and adequately be accomplished by legislation based on
nation-wide and international studies of the problem, and
with provision for prospective application sufficiently in advance not to cause major disturbances in the whole field of
marine insurance, rather than by chipping away piece-meal
at the problem
by occasional court decisions on a case-by94
case basis.
V.

THE FLORIDA JOINDER RULE

The Louisiana- and Puerto Rico cases, where direct actions against
insurers and limitation proceedings were consolidated, contained two
common elements which militate against the adoption of such a procedure in Florida. First, the direct actions were filed against the shipowner's insurer without joinder of the shipowner in the federal court
where the limitation proceeding was pending. Second, the law of both
Louisiana and Puerto Rico prohibited the insurer from availing itself
of the personal defenses of the insured.
A plaintiff cannot maintain an action directly against a liability
91. In re Harbor Towing Corp., 335 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Md. 1971); Pettus v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 322 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Pa. 197 1); In re Pacific Navigation Co., 263 F. Supp. 915 (D.

Hawaii 1967).
92. Pettus v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 322 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Pa. 1971); In re Pacific
Inland Navigation Co., 263 F. Supp. 915 (D. Hawaii 1967).

In Pettus the court stated at 1081:
The doctrine of limitation of liability is centuries old and antedates the institution of liability
insurance. The advent and widespread use of maritime liability insurance suggest that a
re-examination of the doctrine of limited liability might be warranted. However, Congress
codified the doctrine in 1851 and then reconsidered and amended the codification in 1935,
well after the advent of the institution of liability insurance, without providing any
exception to the applicability of the doctrine where liability insurance is carried by a
shipowner.
Congress has more recently reconsidered this matter when bills to abolish limitation of liability in
cases of personal injury were rejected by both the House and the Senate. S. 3251, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1966); H.R. 17254, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
93. 322 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
94. Id. at 1081, quoting In re Pacific Inland Navigation Co., 263 F. Supp. 915, 919 (D. Hawaii
1967).
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insurer in either a state or federal court in Florida without joining the
insured. In Kephart v. Pickens, 95 an injured plaintiff filed suit directly
against the insurer of an allegedly negligent driver without joining the
insured. The court upheld an order dismissing the complaint on the
ground that Shingleton9 6 created no new substantive right, but rather
"merely created a procedural innovation, ' 97 and therefore the plaintiff
had no cause of action against the insurer.
Therefore, in Florida, in order to sue the insurer of a shipowner in
the same federal court in which the petition for limitation of liability is
pending, or any other court, it would be necessary to join the shipowner as a party defendant. However, once a shipowner files his
petition for limitation of liability, the admiralty court, upon application of the petitioner,
must enjoin all claims and proceedings against
98
the shipowner.
Thus, by command of a federal statute no other state or federal
action against the shipowner with respect to the matter in question
may continue once the petition for limitation of liability is filed and
proper security given. Therefore, a claimant could not institute an
action against the shipowner and its insurer in a federal court in which
a limitation proceeding already was pending. Likewise, if the action
against the shipowner and the insurer were filed first, that action
would cease upon the filing of the petition for limitation. Consequently, the situation presented in Florida will be significantly different
from that of Louisiana or Puerto Rico where two independent actions
pending in the same court were consolidated. 99
In the Independent Towing and Torres cases, the courts relied on
state law which held that in a direct action, an insurer could be held
liable notwithstanding the personal defenses of the insured, and concluded that the insurer could not avail itself of the personal defense of
95. 271 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
96. See notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text.
97. 271 So. 2d at 164.
98. 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1970) states: "Upon compliance with the requirements of this section all
claims and proceedings against the owner with respect to the matter in question shall cease." And
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure supplemental rule F(3) provides: "On application of the plaintiff the
court shall enjoin the further prosecution of any action or proceeding against the plaintiff or his
property with respect to any claim subject to limitation in the action."
99. The United States Supreme Court has held that a claimant may pursue his cause of action
against a shipowner in a state court, where the claims against the shipowner do not exceed the
amount of the limitation fund. Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147 (1957). InHenn the Court
reasoned that "where the fund created pursuant to the Act is inadequate to cover all damages and the
owner has sought the protection of the Act the issues arising from the disaster could be litigated
within the limitation proceeding." Id. at 151. But "where the value of the vessel and the pending
freight, the fund paid into the proceeding by the offending owner, exceeds the claims made against it,
there is no necessity for the maintenance of the concourse." Id. at 152.
Thus, a Florida claimant could probably effect joinder of a shipowner's insurer in an action in a
Florida state court where the amount of the claim does not exceed the amount of the limitation fund.
But the objective of joinder of an insurer has been to obtain a judgment against the insurer for an
amount in excess of the limitation fund. If such joinder can be effected only when the amount
recoverable is less than the amount of the limitation fund, that objective will not be realized.
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limitation of liability. The district court in Louisiana noted that under
state law, an insurer could not assert such defenses as infancy, coverture, charitable immunity, governmental immunity, lunacy, or band10 0
ruptcy.
In Florida, however, under the Shingleton rule such defenses may
operate to preclude recovery from the insurer. In Russell v. Orange
County10 1 a plaintiff injured in an automobile accident sued Orange
County and its liability insurer alleging negligence in maintaining the
county road on which he was injured. Orange County asserted the
defense of governmental immunity and the action against it was dismissed. Thereafter, the action against the insurer was dismissed for
lack of an indispensable party-the insured, Orange Countynotwithstanding the plaintiff's argument that the insurance company
should be estopped from asserting the defense of governmental immunity.
Although the court in Russell did not squarely rule on the issue of
whether an insurance company may raise the personal defenses of the
insured, by the nature of the Florida joinder rule, such defenses inure
to the benefit of the insurer. Therefore, the law of Florida, unlike that
of Louisiana or Puerto Rico, provides no compelling reason to prevent
the defense of limitation of liability from likewise inuring to the benefit
of the insurer.
Further, significant conceptual differences between the Florida
joinder rule and the Louisiana and Puerto Rico direct action statutes
lead to the conclusion that the defense of limitation of liability would
be available to an insurer joined with an insured in Florida. Under the
Florida rule the liability of the insurer is dependent upon that of the
insured, 10 2 and although the insured may be joined as a party defendant, no cause of action exists against the insurer until judgment has
10 3
been entered against the insured.
In Davis v. Williams10 4 a wrongful death action was instituted
against the insured. Over two years later, the plaintiff compelled the
joinder of the insurer as a party defendant. The insurer raised the
defense of the two-year statute of limitation for wrongful death. 10 5 The
court held that the insurer was properly joined in that the statute of
limitations had not yet commenced to run since no cause of action had
yet accrued against the insurer. The court stated that the cause of
action against the insurer "does not accrue until after [the plaintiff] has
secured a judgment against the alleged defendant tort-feasor to whom
1 0° 6
[the insurer] issued its policy of professional liability insurance.
Thus, in Florida the liability of the insurer is wholly dependent
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Charles Ferran & Co., 251 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. La. 1966).
237 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
Id.
Davis v. Williams, 239 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 95.11(6) (1973).

106. Davis v. Williams, 239 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
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upon the judgment against the insured. The purpose of the joinder
rule is not to increase the liability of insurers, but rather to assure the
prevailing plaintiff that technicalities in the insurance policy would not
bar his recovery. 107 It would be inconsistent with the theory and policy
of the joinder rule to render a judgment against the insured and then
render a judgment for a greater amount against his insurer.
The issue will most likely arise, however, in a federal admiralty
action where the Florida joinder procedure may not be at all applicable. In the Louisiana and Puerto Rico cases, the claimants had obtained jurisdiction over the insurers on grounds independent of the
admiralty proceedings for limitation of liability. Since the admiralty
proceedings and the actions against the insurers were pending in the
same court, the cases were consolidated to avoid two trials of the same
08
issues of fact and law.1
In Florida, however, independent jurisdiction over an insurer in
the same federal court as the admiralty court limitation proceeding is
unlikely since joinder of the insured shipowner is necessary in order to
maintain an action against the insurer, and any such joinder will be
enjoined by the admiralty court. Therefore, any joinder of the shipowner's insurer would have to be effectuated as a matter of admiralty
law in an admiralty court.
In the Olympic Towing case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
expressly declined to rule upon the issue of whether a direct action
against an insurance company could be maintained under principles of
admiralty law.1 09 In three other cases, however, courts have held that
110
such a direct action cannot be maintained under admiralty law.
Therefore, since no joinder of an insurance company could be accomplished under general principles of admiralty law, it could not be
effectuated in a Florida limitation of liability proceeding unless the
Shingleton joinder rule were held to be applicable in an admiralty
proceeding.
As a general rule, state substantive law may be applied in an
admiralty proceeding where it does not conflict with a congressional
act or affect the uniformity of admiralty law."' However, state rem112
edies and procedure may not be enforced in admiralty.
107. In Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713, 719 (Fla. 1969), the Supreme Court of Florida
explained this policy:
Delays of the insured in filing proof of claim, claims of excess of other insurance, claims of
misrepresentation, failure to seek early arbitration, and a variety of other defenses growing
out of policy provisions can be asserted vis-i-vis the liability of the insurer against the
insured which may operate, and often do, to defeat recovery by the injured third party
beneficiary.
108. E.g., Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nebel Towing Co., 419 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1969).
109. The Court further stated: "Neither do we decide whether suit could be filed directly
against the insurance company under principles of maritime law under allegations that the
insurance policy is a maritime contract." Id. at 236.
110. See note 91 supra.
111. Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 591 (1959); Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 F.
319 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff'd, 5 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1924).
112. Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 591 (1959); Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 F.
319(S.D.N.Y. 192 1), aff'd, 5 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1924). See 2AM. JUR. 2dAdmiralty §§ 92, 137 (1962).
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While it is true that, if substantive rights are created by a
state statute, a federal court may enforce these even if it must
depart in minor particulars from some of the rules of proce-

dure outlined in the statute [citations omitted], it is not within
the power of the state to regulate the procedure and practice
of a federal court of admiralty.113
The Shingleton joinder rule has repeatedly and emphatically been
characterized by the Florida courts as a mere "procedural innova-

tion"'1 14 which was not meant to and did not change substantive

law of this state." 115 Although one federal court in New York has
characterized the Shingleton rule as a substantive right for conflicts of
law purposes, 1 6 it seems apparent in light of later clarification in
Florida decisions that the court in New York had misconstrued the
Shingleton decision. 11 7 Since the Florida joinder rule is a procedural
device, it may well be held not to apply in an admiralty court.
Further, the Shingleton decision was based upon a construction of
the Florida procedure rule relating to real parties in interest." s This
rule differs significantly from the applicable rule in admiralty, rule
17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 119 As a matter of federal
law, it has been held that an insurer may not be joined as real party
in interest to an action against an insured. 120 Thus, not only is the
113. Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 F. 319, 323(S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff'd, 5 F.2d 218
(2d Cir. 1924).
114. Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 230 So. 2d 495,499 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), aff'd, 237 So.
2d 163 (Fla. 1970).
115. Durrett v. Davidson, 239 So. 2d 46, 48 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970). See Kephartv. Pickens, 271
So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973); Davis v. Williams, 239 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1st. Dist. 1970).
116. Barrios v. Dade County, 310 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
117. When the Barrios case was decided on Jan. 7, 1970, the only enunciation of the Florida
joinder rule for insurers was the Shingleton decision. The court in Barriosstated that Shingleton
recognizes a substantive right in an injured person as a third-party beneficiary of the
insurance policy to recover directly from the liability insurer of the tortfeasor. Florida, no
less than Puerto Rico, created "a separate and distinct right of action against the insured
where no such right had previously existed ......
Id. at 748. While such an interpretation of Shingleton was not wholly unreasonable when the
Barrioscase was decided, subsequent decisions by the Florida courts clearly indicate that Shingleton
was intended only to provide for joinder of an insurer as a matter of procedural convenience and
definitely did not create any new right of action or any other substantive right.
118. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210 (1973).
119. While the language of the Florida and federal rules is similar, the Florida rule adds the
sentence:
All persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief
demanded may join as plaintiffs and any person maybe made a defendantwho has or claims
an interest adverse to the plaintiff. (Emphasis added.)
This sentence, which is not a part of the federal rule, was stressed in the Shingleton opinion as a basis
for the decision.
120. See, e.g., Tubize Chatillon Corp. v. White Transp. Co., 11 F. Supp. 91 (D. Md. 1935),
wherein the court stated:
In the field of insurance of property, whether against fire or marine risks, it is the wellestablished law that no person may sue on the contract unless specifically named therein, or
unless the policy contains general language inclusive of the party to be benefited.
"The injured person has no right of action against the insurer except where it is given by the
terms of the policy or by statute."
Id. at 98-99.
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Florida joinder rule inapplicable because it is procedural, but it also
appears to conflict with the applicable admiralty procedure.
Even if the Florida joinder rule were held to embody a substantive right, it is likely that the rule would still be inapplicable in a
limitation of liability proceeding as it conflicts with the Limitation of
Liability Act and with the uniformity of admiralty law. The issue
presented would be similar to that of the Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Cushing case.'

21

In Cushing, however, the issue involved the validity of a state
statute authorizing direct actions against a shipowner's insurer in a
collateral proceeding. In Florida the issue would involve the applicability of a state joinder rule to alter directly the limitation of liability
proceeding.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In recent years the courts have demonstrated a significant hostility
toward the application of the Limitation of Liability Act in personal
injury cases. The development of the flotilla doctrine, single claimant
rule, and the inapplicability of the Limitation Act to contract actions
and maintenance and cure actions are examples of this trend. In this
same vein the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
decided in favor of permitting direct actions against insurers in the
Cushing and Olympic Towing cases. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit might
look favorably upon an attempt to join an insurer under Florida's
joinder rule.
The Limitation of Liability Act was passed in 185 1, however, for
the purpose of placing the United States shipping industry on an equal
footing with that of the great trading nations of the world. Since that
time, generous subsidies have been provided by Congress to further
effect that purpose. The present depressed state of the American
shipping industry, however, demonstrates that Congress' purpose has
not yet been achieved. Furthermore, Congress itself has refused to
alter the Limitation Act to provide greater recovery for injured persons.
In addition to these policy considerations, the technical case militates strongly against joinder of an insurer in a Florida limitation of
liability proceeding. First, the Florida joinder rule is procedural and
inapplicable in an admiralty proceeding. Second, even if the Florida
rule were applicable, it does not recognize liability of an insurer
greater than that of an insured. It would be an anomalous result if
Florida law could be applied in an admiralty court to reach a decision
at which no court in Florida would arrive in interpreting the same
law. Third, the joinder rule is clearly in conflict with admiralty law as
stated in the Limitation Act and Supplemental rule F of the Federal
121. 347 U.S. 409 (1954).
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Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, a court which wished as a matter of
policy to join the insurer would have to overcome these technical
obstacles as well as countervailing policy considerations. 12 2
Further, such a court ruling might have the effect of causing
greater hardship to injured claimants rather than relieving their burden. As this ruling would clearly disrupt the uniformity of admiralty
law, the liability of a shipowner and his insurer would be greater in
Florida than it would be in an admiralty court of another state. With
the ease of forum shopping under the Limitation Act, 12 3 petitioners
wishing to avoid the Florida rule would probably file for limitation of
liability in distant forums, thereby increasing the difficulty of recovery for injured claimants.
Thus, the appropriate forum for resolution of this issue is the
United States Congress. So far Congress has been reluctant to disturb
the Limitation Act due to the ailing United States merchant marine. In
order to achieve both national policy goals of promoting the shipping
industry and compensating those suffering bodily harm, Congress
should provide a public fund out of which such claimants could be
made whole.
122. In a court order dated July 16, 1975, United States District Judge for the Southern District
of Florida C. Clyde Atkins consolidatedZambranav. Tugboat Mary B, Case No. 75-470-Civ-CA and
In re Dock and Marine Construction Co., Case No. 75-1131-Civ-CA (a limitation of liability
proceeding brought by the owners of the tugboat May B) and allowed the plaintiff Zambrana's
motion to file an amended complaint joining the defendant's insurer. The case was subsequently
settled out of court, however, so there was no further consideration of issues raised by this comment.
123. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.

